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the probability that it was intended to, and did, secure an involuntary
confession is increased to the degree of practically excluding any
other possibility.78 Such logic should commend itself to the legislature of New York. Furthermore, the heretofore ignored provisions
of Section 1844 of the Penal Law, making it a misdemeanor to unreasonably delay a prisoner's arraignment, should be strictly enforced. 79 In this manner, the sovereign State of New York would
indicate to its police that lazy, brutal, and unconscionable methods
of criminal investigation will be no more tolerated in the courts of
this state than they are in the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is to be further hoped that the Stein case will be limited to its
peculiar facts and that the policy of the Malinski and Rochin cases,
envisioning a growing concept of "due process," will continue to be
the law of the land.

A
SHIPOWNER'S LIABILITY FOR THE "UNsEAWORTHINESS" OF A VESSEL
DUE TO AN ASSAULT BY A FELLOW CREWMEMBER

The seaman, in his position as the favored "ward of Admiralty,"
has historically been treated generously in compensation benefits for
disabilities suffered during employment. The passage of years has in
no way diminished the propensity of the courts to aid an injured
seaman. Indeed, the courts' patronage has become so zealous that
Judge Learned Hand apparently felt that it was time to apply the
judicial brakes just short of holding the employer to be an absolute
insurer of the safety of workers in his employ. In the recent case of
Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit refused to hold a shipowner liable to an employe for injuries
sustained due to an assault by a fellow crewmember. The plaintiff
and a seaman named Hunter had an argument in the ship's engine
room. Upon returning to his quarters, plaintiff was viciously as78 The federal rule of evidence established in McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332 (1943), modified by United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65
(1944), and clarified in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948), recognizes that when the delay in commitment was for the sole purpose of extracting a confession, the probability of coercion is so great that an irrebuttable
presumption of its presence arises. See 26 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 351 (1952).
S9Diligent research has failed to reveal one case in which a police officer
was prosecuted under this section although violations of § 165 abound in the
field of criminal procedure. See Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due

Process Clause, 15 BROOKLyN L. REv. 51, 70-71 (1948).

1204 F. 2d 815 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 72 (1953).
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saulted by Hunter. Although Hunter employed only his hands and
feet, the beating sustained by Jones was so severe that he will be
crippled for life. The Federal District Court, Judge Murphy presiding, found no evidence of negligence on the employer's part in hiring Hunter.2 Judgment was granted for plaintiff, however, on the
basis of a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, 3 the court relying
directly on the statements of Judge Learned Hand in Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp.,4 concerning the warranty of a shipowner to
outfit a ship with a seaworthy crew. In the Keen case, one Keen and
a cook, while returning on a launch from shore leave, engaged in a
violent argument. After a scuffle on the ship's deck, the cook went
below and obtained a cleaver with which he inflicted serious injuries
on the plaintiff. Suit was instituted against the shipowner based on
hi§ negligence in employing a man of the cook's vicious nature. An
alternate claim was based on the ship's unseaworthy state in having
such a man as a member of the crew. The injured party sought to
introduce evidence of the temperamental unfitness of the cook, but
such evidence was excluded at the trial because plaintiff had failed to
establish that the employer was chargeable with notice of the cook's
dangerous behavior. Judgment was granted for the defendant as the
jury failed to find that the shipowner had notice of dangerous proclivities of the assailant, prior to the assault on the plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 5 Judge Learned Hand writing the opinion, sent the case back to the lower court for a new trial
on the ground that the trial judge's instructions to the jury had
been erroneous. The court stated that the owner's warranty of the
competence of his crew is not dependent upon his knowledge of a defect in a member's disposition, and that proof of notice of a crewman's vile temper is not a prerequisite to recovery. The cost of insuring the temper of the crew, reasoned the court, is an expense
incurred in the normal operation of a shipping line and will be eventually passed on to the shippers who use the line to transport their
goods. 6 Language was used which predicated an owner's liability for
an assault by a fellow employe solely on the fact that one of its
crew was injured, not that the employer should have foreseen and
prevented its occurrence.
2 103 F. Supp. 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
3Id. at 326. Limits on the warranty are discussed.

The court feels that
if the battery was iustified or based on sufficient provocation, the owner might
not be deemed liable.
4 194 F. 2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. dentied, 343 U. S. 966 (1952).

1Ibid.

6 "... [T]hat is no reason why an individual seaman who has suffered
because his fellow is not up to his work, must bear the loss. Substantially
all maritime risks are insured, and if we must suppose that the addition of this
risk will show in the premiums, in the end it will be likely also to show in
freight rates; and so far as it does, the recovery will be spread among those
who use the ships." Id. at 518.
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Judge Hand, when called upon to review virtually the same factual situation in the Jones case,7 refused to follow his own explicit
expressions in the Keen case as to the absolute duty of a shipowner
to provide a safe ship, with a crew of seaworthy disposition. The
lower court's award of damages for the plaintiff was reversed and the
complaint was dismissed. The Jones case was distinguished from
the Keen case, primarily because in the Jones case no weapon was
used. 8 Since there was no dangerous weapon employed, nor any
warning to the shipowner of Hunter's dangerous propensities, there
was no ground on which to base a shipowner's liability for providing
an unseaworthy ship.
It is very difficult to find valid justification for the distinction
advanced by Judge Hand. In both cases, the injury was severe.
Neither case was decided on the shipowner's negligence in causing
or contributing to the incident. The use of a cleaver in the one case
and the absence of it in the other case appears to be the only recognizable distinction, and such distinction is tenuous at best. A person who suffers a vicious beating can be severely injured without
the use of a weapon. If the shipowner is to be liable without regard
to fault, the distinction should not be made to depend upon the
instrumentality which caused the disability.
The seaman has always enjoyed greater protection as a "ward
of Admiralty" than that afforded to workers engaged in other fields
of employment. As early as 1823, a court allowed a seaman who
became incapacitated by illness or injury a right to recover for the
cost of sustenance and treatment while he was convalescing. 9 The
right to maintenance and cure is granted in case of injury or illness
without regard to the cause, 10 the only limitation being that where the
sailor wilfully caused his own injury, recovery is denied."2 This
right granted by courts of admiralty remains effective today.'
7Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F. 2d 815 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
74 Sup. Ct. 72 (1953).
8 "Such a set-to seldom results in serious injury, when only fists are used,
and we are to judge Hunter's disposition, not by the fact that the plaintiff
broke his hip, but by what would ordinarily follow from what he did." Id. at
817.
9Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6,047 (C. C. D. Me. 1823);
see also The George, 10 Fed. Cas. 205, No. 5,329 (C. C. D. Mass. 1832)
Reed0 v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641 (C. C. D. Mass. 1832).
1 See Farrell v. United States, 336 U. S. 511, 516 (1949) (".. . [T]he
master .. .must maintain and care for even the erring and careless seaman,
much as a parent would a child."); The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175 (1903).
11 See Warren v. United States, 340 U. S.523, 528 (1951) ("In the maritime law it has long been held that while fault of the seaman will forfeit the
right to maintenance and cure, it must be some 'positively vicious conductsuch as gross negligence or willful disobedience of orders.'"); Farrell v.
United States, supra note 10 at 516.
12 See Aguilar v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 751 (E. D. Pa. 1950);
Levenson, Current Developnwnts in the Field of Maintenance and Cure, 11
NACCA L. J. 140 (1953).
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In addition to maintenance and cure, indemnity for injuries
caused by the owner's negligence in providing an "unseaworthy" ship
has been granted.' 3 This remedy was subject, however, to the defenses of the fellow-servant rule,' 4 which denied recovery to an employe whose injury resulted from the negligence of a co-worker.
Congress, by enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones
Act)15 increased the remedies available to an injured seaman,' 6 and
at the same time removed the above-mentioned common-law defense
as a bar to recovery.'
A cause of action based on the Jones Act
precludes a suit under the "unseaworthiness" concept of liability, and
the seaman must elect under which theory to prosecute his action.' 8
This article will be limited to the discussion of the courts' interpretation of the remedy available when a shipowner breaches his duty
to provide his employes with a "seaworthy" ship.' 9
Although the origin of a seaman's right to indemnity for injuries
sustained where the owner provides an "unseaworthy" vessel is somewhat speculative, it is probably derived from the ancient privilege of
a sailor to abandon his vessel if it was unsafe.20 Some courts which
dealt with the problem took the position that the owner was not an
insurer of the crew's safety. 21 For liability to arise, the defect was
required to be of such a nature as to place a person on notice of its
inherent danger.22 Other decisions based liability upon the breach
of an absolute duty of the shipowner to provide a safe vessel for the
crew.2 This conflict was resolved in 1944 by the Supreme Court's
'3

See The Osceola, supra note 10 at 175.

14 Burton v. Greig, 271 Fed. 271 (5th Cir. 1921) ; The City of Alexandria,

17 Fed. 390 (S. D. N. Y. 1883) ; see The Osceola, supra note 10 at 175.
1541 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C. (1946) passim.
16 Section 33 of the Jones Act [41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688
(1946)] gives the seaman injured in the course of his employment a right of
action for damages at law. Trial by jury is permitted and in case of death
because of the injury, the right of action passes to his personal representatives.
See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 118, 120 (1936).
17 Becker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 179 F. 2d 713 (2d Cir. 1950) ; see Beadle
v. Spencer 298 U. S. 124, 128 (1936).
IsSee Vacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 138 (1928). But ef.
McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F. 2d 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U. S. 868 (1949).
10 For a comprehensive treatment of the field of a seaman's rights where
injured, see Comment, The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal
Injury
20 Remedies, 57 YALE L. J. 243 (1947).
See The Arizona v. Anelich, supra note 16 at 121 n. 2.
2
'See The Tawmie, 80 F. 2d 792, 793 (5th Cir. 1936); Kahyis v. Arundel
Corp., 3 F. Supp. 492, 495 (D. Md. 1933); The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. 477,
478 (S.D. Ala. 1887).
22 Burton v. Greig, 271 Fed. 271 (5th Cir. 1921). "We understand that
under the American law the shipowner . . . is not liable . . . if due care was

used in furnishing the appliance and in keeping it in safe condition and repair."
Id. at 273. See The Tawmie, supra note 21 at 793.
23 The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F. 2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
[T]he
T...
liability
for any injuries arising out of the neglect to supply a seaworthy vessel is not
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decision in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.2 4 In that case, the libellant
was injured by a scaffolding which fell as a result of the parting of a
defective rope. The employer proved that a safe rope was available
for use, and thus sought to avoid liability on the ground that the libellant's injury was caused by the negligence of the mate in selecting
the defective rope, rather than by the ship being in an unsafe condition. The Court, in allowing recovery to the seaman, based liability
not on negligence, but on the presence of a defective applianceY5
The breaking of the rope made the device unseaworthy, and as a consequence, the shipowner was liable for breaching his duty to provide
a safe ship.26 The case of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,27 decided
in 1946, clarified and extended the shipowner's liability for maintaining an unsafe place for the crew to perform its duty. Plaintiff,
employed as a longshoreman by an independent contractor, was injured when a loading boom fell. The trial court 28 found no negligence on the shipowner's part as the break was caused by a defect
in the manufacture of the part. The Circuit Court of Appeals 29 reversed in favor of the plaintiff, although sustaining the trial court's
finding of fact, and the Supreme Court affirmed, three justices dissenting.30 The Court then held that a shipowner's freedom from
negligence does not relieve him from liability where a ship is
unseaworthy.31
Where injury results from the presence of
defective equipment,3 2 the owner is responsible and must provide
indemnification.
Concurrent with the growth of the warranty on a ship's applidependent on the exercise of reasonable care but is absolute." Id. at 710. See
The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U. S. 199, 201 (1894).
24321
U. S. 96 (1944). 25
Id. at 103.

28 See the dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts in Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co., supra note 24 at 105, for a strict interpretation of what constitutes
"unseaworthiness."
27 328 U. S. 85 (1946).
28 Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724 (E. D. Pa. 1944).
29 149 F. 2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945).
30 The decision of the majority allowing a longshoreman, not working for
the shipowner, to collect for breach of seaworthiness is attacked as an unwarranted extension of liability. Congress, in 1927, had enacted a Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33
U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1946), to provide compensation for injuries arising
in the course of employment. "There would seem to be no occasion for us to
be more generous than Congress has been by presenting to them [longshoremen] paid-up accident insurance policies at the expense of a vessel by which
they have not been employed, and which has not failed in any duty of due care
toward them." Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, mtpra note 27 at 107 (dissenting opinion).
31 Id. at 94.
32 See Krey v. United States, 123 F. 2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941), for a case holding a ship "unseaworthy" where a seaman, while the ship was at dock, slipped
on the soapy floor of a shower and was injured.
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ances, there arose a warranty as to the competence of the crew. A
vessel was not considered seaworthy where a crew was incapable of
performing its assigned duties. 33 Where a Chinese crew could not
understand the commands of its Caucasian officers, the ship was
deemed to be unsafe, and the owners were held responsible for the
loss of life and property. 34 The Rolph 35 was a case in which the
libellant seaman was disabled by a beating at the hands of the mate
of the ship on which he was employed. It was shown that the mate
was known to have a vicious disposition and that the owner had
been put on notice of similar beatings administered to other members
of the crew. The court, in holding for the libellant, ruled that a
shipowner was under a duty to provide a master and crew which was
competent to properly operate the vessel. A crew is 36not competent
where the mate has a brutal and inhuman disposition.
The courts of Admiralty, by their granting of special protection to the seaman, have placed him in the position of being a favored
worker as contrasted with other categories of employes. The following hypothetical will illustrate the advantage of a seaman over a
worker who has not been granted this special protection. In a factory two employes exchange blows after a dispute. In a fit of rage,
one picks up a hammer and proceeds to use it on his opponent, resulting in serious injuries. Can it be said that the employer has maintained a dangerous plant? Obviously not. The plant owner, unaware of any dangerous propensities on the part of an employe, cannot
be said to be negligent in causing the injury. Not being in a posi37
tion to prevent the injury, he cannot be held liable for its occurrence.
However, where such an incident occurred on a ship, and the injuries
were sustained by a seaman, recovery was
permitted against the em38
ployer under the same factual situation.
No evidence was found in the Keen case to show that the dispute was in any manner related to the performance of duties as a
seaman. In the Jones case there was a dispute which related directly
to the functioning of the ship.3 9 The cause of the dispute should
have some relevance in the granting or withholding of indemnity.
33 See In re Meyer, 74 Fed. 881, 885 (N. D. Cal. 1896) ; Holland v. Seven
Hundred
and Seventy-Five Tons of Coal 36 Fed. 784, 787 (E. D. Wis. 1888).
34
In re Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 130 tFed. 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 195
U. S. 632 (1904).
35299 Fed. 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 614 (1924).
36 See Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945); Koehler v.
Presque-Isle Transp. Co., 141 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 764

(1944).

37 Recovery may be permitted under a Workmen's Compensation Law if the
injuries were received in the scope of the employment. See note 49 infra.
3SKeen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F. 2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 39U. S. 966 (1952).
Jones found Hunter had failed to properly maintain some equipment in
the engine room.
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The Jones case, in holding that injuries alone were not sufficient to
permit recovery, seems to limit strictly the Keen case. In view of the
apparent contradiction between the cases, it may be assumed that
Judge Hand decided that his own views in the Keen case went too
far in extending an owner's liability in the case of an assault. The
limitation of the grounds for recovery to the case in which a weapon
is used eliminates the majority of claims based on injuries arising
from an assault.40 The purpose of the limitation may be laudable,
but the criteria used are not. Either the shipowner is liable for any
injury which occurs to a crewmember, without regard to the cause,
or recovery should be strictly limited to an injury which could be
prevented by use of reasonable care. The Supreme Court, in denying
certiorari, 41 has left unresolved the apparent conflict with regard to
the extent of an employer's responsibility for the "disposition" of his
crew.
The doctrine of "unseaworthiness" has been overextended by the
courts. It is interpreted to include longshoremen, 42 harborworkers 43
and others who are not in the employ of the shipowner. 44 Recovery
has been permitted merely because a man is employed on a ship and
has been injured. 45 Fault and negligence have been ignored as the
40 "Sailors lead a rough life and are more apt to use their fists than office
employees; what will seem to sedentary and protected persons an insufficient
provocation for a personal encounter, is not the measure of the 'disposition' of
'the ordinary men in the calling."' Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F. 2d
815, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 72 (1953).
-174 Sup. Ct. 72 (1953).
42 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946).
43 Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 198 F. 2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952) (ship's
carpenter employed by an independent contractor); Capadona v. The Lake
Atlin, 101 F. Supp. 851 (S. D. Cal. 1951) (oil barge employe within the class
permitted recovery for breach of the warranty of "seaworthiness"). For cases
applying the Sieracki case, supra note 39, to longshoremen, laborers and carpenters, see Capadona v. The Lake Atlin, supra at 852 n. 1.
44 Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E. D. Mo.
1951) (grain corporation employe recovered for the unseaworthiness of a
ship). But se? Guerrini v. United States, 167 F. 2d 352, 354 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U. S. 843 (1948) (An employe of an independent contractor, hired
to clean the ship's tanks and boilers, was injured by falling into a hold after
slipping on a grease spot. The court in denying a breach of seaworthiness as
to plaintiff, said, "Yet we should hesitate to read the decision [Sieracki case,
supra note 42] as intended to extend the protection of what amounts to a warranty of seaworthiness to all workmen upon a ship, however much their relation to the employer is unlike the early paternalistic status of master and
crew, many of whose features have vestigially persisted to the present time.
At any rate it is proper, if such an innovation is to be made, that it should
await the sanction of the Supreme Court in the exercise of supplying the inadequacies of the past." Id. at 354) ; Martini v. United States, 192 F. 2d 649
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 926 (1952).
45 Dayton v. Midland S.S. Lines, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 418 (W. D. N. Y.
1953). Plaintiff was injured when he came into contact with a pipe vise which
was part of the permanent structure and plainly visible. "Irrespective of
any unseaworthiness of the vessel, or any defects of the ways, works and ma-
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basis of liability.46 If'injury alone is to be sufficient basis for recovery, then the change should be accomplished by congressional action rather than judicial legislation. Congress, through the Jones
Act, uses negligence as the determinant of liability. 47 States have
provided for recovery, without regard to fault, by the enactment of
Workmen's Compensation Laws. 48 Injury in the scope of employment entitles the worker to a designated award if the employment is
covered.49 The New York Workmen's Compensation Act has been
construed to permit recovery where disability was occasioned by an
assault by a fellow worker.50 Congress has not seen fit to extend
the statutory remedy of the Jones Act to the situation where the injury was not the fault of the employer. If it is in the national interest to base recovery solely upon injury, Congress is certainly in a
better position to make that determination than the judiciary.
Today, the seaman has, by virtue of the historic preference
granted by Admiralty, greater rights than employes in other occupations. He is entitled to maintenance and cure in the event of sickness or accidental injury.51 This right continues as long as treatment will be of benefit to the seaman. 52 In addition, he may recover
damages if he has been injured because of the employer's negligence
or failure to maintain a "seaworthy" ship. Is the seaman "poor"
and "oppressed" to the extent of according him greater rights than
chinery, it is believed, under the authorities ... some liability must be charged
against the defendant.... As a matter of fact, the injuries, in the opinion of
the court, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff." Id. at 419-420.
46 See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S.96 (1944) ; Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 42.
47 "But damages may be recovered under the Jones Act only for negligence." De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U. S.660, 671 (1943).
.. I agree further that the Jones Act is not a workmen's compensation act
and does not impose liability without fault.

.

.

."

Id. at 672 (dissenting

opinion); Engel v. Daveriort, 271 U. S.33, 36 (1926).

48N. Y. WoRmimN's COmP. LAW § 10 ("Every employer subject to this
chapter shall . .. secure compensation to his employees and pay or provide compensation for their disability or death from injury arising out of and in the
course of the employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury.... ")
(emphasis added); MIcH. ComP. LAws §§ 412.1-412.2 (1948) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 41 (Purdon, 1952).
49 N. Y. WoRxlsmE's Comt. LAw § 15; MIcH. ComP. LAws §§ 412.9-412.12
(1948);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 511-513 (Purdon, 1952).
50
Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750 (1916) ; Katz v. Reissman
Rothman Corp., 261 App. Div. 862, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 807 (3d Dep't 1941)
(Claimant was attacked by a co-worker who apparently was jealous of attentions paid to claimant by a third co-worker of the opposite sex. The claimant
recovered as the injury was deemed to have arisen in the course of the employment.); Levy v. World-Telegram, 259 App. Div. 943, 19 N. Y. S. 2d
890 (3d Dep't 1940), aff'd mem., 285 N. Y. 533, 32 N. E. 2d 827 (1941).
51
See note 12 supra.
62

Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 92 F. 2d 84 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
303 U. S.643 (1938). But cf. Farrell v. United States, 336 U. S.511 (1949)
(maintenance and cure for life denied by a 5 to 4 decision).
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a worker who labors on land? This problem is of importance not
only to the seaman and the shipowner but to the public at large, because it is the public who ultimately will bear the burden of taxation
necessary to finance the large subsidies paid to maintain the shipping industry. It is to be hoped that by focusing attention on the
problem, a solution satisfactory to all parties may be reached.

A
AIR CARRIERS-NOTICE OF CLAIM AND TIME FOR SUIT
LIMITATIONS

Introduction
No action may be maintained for injury to, or death of, a passenger, unless notice of claim in writing is presented to the general
office of the carrier within ninety days following the occurrence of
the event giving rise thereto, and unless the action is actually commenced within one year after such occurrence.
This is a typical clause utilized by many air carriers 1 for the

alleged purpose of protecting themselves from fraudulent claims. The
thought is that prompt notice to the carrier permits an investigation
as to the nature of an injured passenger's claim. The fraudulently
disposed passenger-one whose injuries seem to multiply with the
passage of time-is thus discouraged from capitalizing on the staleness
of his claim.
The bona fide passenger, however, is likewise subject to the provision. His is a helpless plight, for in most instances, he is not even
aware of the existence of such a condition to the carrier's liability.
He would naturally assume that the pertinent statute of limitations
constitutes the only yardstick as to the time within which he may move
against the carrier to remedy his hurts.
The manner by which the carrier renders this clause operative
is manifestly unfair to passengers. It is the purpose of this note to
examine the inequity of this practice with a view of challenging its
validity.
The air carrier of passengers is the primary target, although
other common carriers must be considered for historical purposes, and
by way of analogy. Personal injury claims of passengers will be

I See McKay, Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal
Injuries, 18 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 160 (1950); 1953 U. S. & CAN. AVIATION
REip. 198, 199 (C. A. B. Docket No. 6149) (The Civil Aeronautics Board is
investigating the reasonableness and lawfulness of such a provision.).

